The perplexing question of why larger nations often struggles or lose in small wars, characterised by limited scope and unconventional conflict, lies at the heart of global military and political analysis. The dynamics of these asymmetric conflicts transcend sheer military might, delving into complex geopolitical, economic, and social factors. In this context, the US war in Afghanistan is a compelling case study, epitomizing the challenges an influential nation faces in such a conflict. This opinion article seeks to unravel why big nations sometimes falter in small wars by examining the US engagement in Afghanistan, offering a comprehensive analysis that delves into the limitations, strategic interests, and cohesion of insurgent forces, ultimately underlining the inefficacy of conventional military advantage.
Limited Wars are necessarily “limited” for the larger nations, which constrains escalation above certain levels. This means that they cannot fully utilize their military and technological superiority. The US engagement in Afghanistan can be characterised as a conflict for the United States due to factors. Despite possessing military and economic power, the US did not deploy all its resources to support the war in Afghanistan. The all-volunteer force that fought in the war comprised a portion of the population. Operation Enduring Freedom’s primary objectives were to eliminate Al-Qaeda and apprehend Osama bin Laden. Compared to total conflicts, when the objective is frequently the elimination of the opponent, this is a more focused and specialized aim.
The US accepted constraints on how it fought the war. For example, even though it had nuclear weapons, it did not use them in this conflict. This is a characteristic of limited wars where combatants accept constraints on their conduct. Limited wars are typically limited to avoid catastrophic escalation and prevent an out-of-the-way conflict from monopolizing a nation’s power and attention. The larger nations often do not have a direct survival interest in these conflicts. As a result, fighting the war does not take automatic priority over other social, political, and economic objectives. The US war in Afghanistan can be seen as a conflict where the US did not have a direct survival interest for several reasons:
The United States doesn't have a long-term justification for keeping a presence in Afghanistan. There are regions of the world where its strategic priorities hold more significance. The economic advantages gained from the war were relatively limited. For instance, although Afghanistan's mineral resources may hold promise, it will likely take five years before they yield significant returns, and there is a strong likelihood that Chinese, Russian, and local investors will play a major role in this regard. Afghanistan, as a sanctuary and base for worldwide terrorism, was a significant cause of the conflict. However, some argued that the Taliban itself does not present an imminent threat to the United States to justify a protracted and costly military campaign to destroy them. From the perspective of “blood and treasure” expenditure and costs, when planned against stability benefits and returns, Western intrusion in Afghanistan can be considered a shared strategic failure.
For rebels in smaller nations, the reality of invasion and occupation fosters solidarity, reduces mobilization constraints, and increases willingness to spend expenditures. This can make them a formidable opponent despite their smaller size and resources. The cohesion and mobilization of insurgents in the context of the US war in Afghanistan can be argued as follows:
The structure of the social networks and institutions upon which the Taliban was built played a significant role in their cohesion. These networks provided a foundation for recruitment, logistics, and operations, enabling the Taliban to maintain a resilient insurgency against the US-led coalition. The Taliban had access to material resources from outside the war zone, which helped sustain their operations. These resources included financial support, weapons, and other supplies, often funneled through complex networks across national borders. Organized insurgent groups are more effective in war-fighting and negotiations, with the Taliban's internal cohesion contributing to their effectiveness. Their global character, linked to Al Qaeda and other international radical groups, further enhanced their cohesion and mobilization. The wars in Vietnam and Algeria demonstrated that conventional military superiority is not a guarantee against defeat in small nations, and the US war in Afghanistan suggests that such superiority may not be effective.
Even though the US troops had equipment, training, and funding compared to the Taliban, they were unable to achieve a victory. This reveals that technological and conventional military superiority does not necessarily translate into tactical success. The strategic failure in Afghanistan demonstrates the ineffectiveness and lack of utility of large-scale conventional land power in low-intensity conflict. The loss shows that adversaries can render conventional land power irrelevant by employing asymmetric actions to deny a decisive battle. Afghanistan proved to be an experience in the limits of America’s military power. It demonstrated the apparent paradox that winning the battles and still losing the war is still there. A technologically advanced force can inflict damage more efficiently than its enemy yet fails to achieve a final result resembling victory. If the Army only considers and prepares for large-scale, force-on-force operations, then adversaries will take advantage of conventional formations’ cumbersome, rigid, and predictable nature.
The American war in Afghanistan is a complex struggle with limited goals, self-imposed limitations, and restricted resource mobilization. The US’s engagement is complicated by geopolitical, economic, and threat perception factors, and the lack of direct survival interests demonstrates this. The rebel forces’ ability to withstand hardship, derived from complex social networks and institutions and strengthened by global unity, remains a formidable obstacle. The US military’s technological superiority highlights the limitations of conventional strength in dealing with asymmetrical warfare. The US experience in Afghanistan exemplifies how complex political, social, and economic interactions often obscure the path to success in minor conflicts.
